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Understanding
9/11Effect of Political Mobilization on Political Violence in Nairobi County, Kenya: Focus on Mathare and Kibra Informal Settlements
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- Publication date
- 2017-06-22
- Usage
- Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0
- Topics
- “in-group”, “out-group”, political mobilization, political violence
- Publisher
- International Journal of Management Sciences (IJMS)
- Collection
- folkscanomy_academic; folkscanomy
- Contributor
- Frank Matanga and Maurice Amutabi
- Language
- English
- Item Size
- 6.8M
This article arose out
of a need to understand better the role of political elite and actors in the
mobilization of ethnic supporters for political action, specifically the
recurrent political violence, in Kibra and Mathare. To investigate how
political elites consolidate ethnic mobilization and use it in political
contests, quantitative analysis was used and involved a proportional stratified
random sample. A sample size of sample size of (n=766) was used and was divided
equally between Kibra (n=383) and Mathare (n=383). The sample was weighted to
reflected the relative sample sizes in Kibra (n=7) and Mathare (n=6). The
sample was disaggregated as “in-group”, “out-group”, and “other-group”. The “in-group”
(n=296) were presumed ethnic supporters of the ruling elite during the 2007
presidential election and the “out-group” (n=268) supported the non-ruling
elite in this contest. Besides, these groups had engaged severally in
ethno-political conflicts in the study area. The “other-group” (n=202) belonged
to smaller ethnic groups living in the study area who did not belong to the
core ethnic groups from who the political elite drew political support. The
group was used as an analytical tool –to compare conflict attitudes and
behaviour against the “in-group and “out-groups.” Regarding political
mobilization apropos the 2007-2008 national election, statistically significant
differences were observed, with the “in-group” having
higher levels of mobilization than the “out-group”. This suggests the “in-group”,
was keener to preserve its status of privilege than the “out-group” was to shed
off its marginalised status. Regarding scores for political violence, the “out-group” had lower scores than the “in-group”,
suggesting the “out-group” had stronger negative attitudes and behaviour
towards the “in-group” than did the latter towards the former group. Hypotheses
testing showed that political mobilization was a significant factor in the
outbreak of political violence in the study area. But significant differences
were observed vis a vis the “in-group” and “out-group”. Political mobilization
was a factor in political violence for the “in-group” and not for the “out-group",
the presumed initiators of the violence in the study area. Political violence occurred
spontaneously when animosities of the “out-group” escalated, triggered by the
declaration of a disputed election. But the use of political violence as a tool
to achieve political objectives was organised and enabled by political elites,
who used ethnic militia to score political objectives.
of a need to understand better the role of political elite and actors in the
mobilization of ethnic supporters for political action, specifically the
recurrent political violence, in Kibra and Mathare. To investigate how
political elites consolidate ethnic mobilization and use it in political
contests, quantitative analysis was used and involved a proportional stratified
random sample. A sample size of sample size of (n=766) was used and was divided
equally between Kibra (n=383) and Mathare (n=383). The sample was weighted to
reflected the relative sample sizes in Kibra (n=7) and Mathare (n=6). The
sample was disaggregated as “in-group”, “out-group”, and “other-group”. The “in-group”
(n=296) were presumed ethnic supporters of the ruling elite during the 2007
presidential election and the “out-group” (n=268) supported the non-ruling
elite in this contest. Besides, these groups had engaged severally in
ethno-political conflicts in the study area. The “other-group” (n=202) belonged
to smaller ethnic groups living in the study area who did not belong to the
core ethnic groups from who the political elite drew political support. The
group was used as an analytical tool –to compare conflict attitudes and
behaviour against the “in-group and “out-groups.” Regarding political
mobilization apropos the 2007-2008 national election, statistically significant
differences were observed, with the “in-group” having
higher levels of mobilization than the “out-group”. This suggests the “in-group”,
was keener to preserve its status of privilege than the “out-group” was to shed
off its marginalised status. Regarding scores for political violence, the “out-group” had lower scores than the “in-group”,
suggesting the “out-group” had stronger negative attitudes and behaviour
towards the “in-group” than did the latter towards the former group. Hypotheses
testing showed that political mobilization was a significant factor in the
outbreak of political violence in the study area. But significant differences
were observed vis a vis the “in-group” and “out-group”. Political mobilization
was a factor in political violence for the “in-group” and not for the “out-group",
the presumed initiators of the violence in the study area. Political violence occurred
spontaneously when animosities of the “out-group” escalated, triggered by the
declaration of a disputed election. But the use of political violence as a tool
to achieve political objectives was organised and enabled by political elites,
who used ethnic militia to score political objectives.
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